Updating diagram
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@ -2,22 +2,28 @@ Access layout looks something like the below:
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```
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```
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Internet
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Internet
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└── Shadowfeed
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└── Shadowfeed
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├<> 10.0.1.0
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├<> 10.0.1.0 -- Internal Subnet
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│ ├── Core
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│ ├<> Core
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^ │ ├── Darknet
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^ │ ├── Darknet
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│ │ ├── Geth-Hub-N
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│ │ ├── Foundation
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│ │ ├── Geth
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│ │ │ ├── Geth-Hubs
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│ │ │ ├── Geth-Eyes
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│ │ │ └── IoT API's
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│ │ ├── IRC
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│ │ ├── Maat
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│ │ ├── Maat
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│ │ ├── MaatBuilder
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│ │ ├── Password
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│ │ └── Sharingan
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│ │ ├── Sharingan
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│ └── Nazara
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│ │ ├── Singularity
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├── 10.0.2.0
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│ │ ├── WolfPack
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│ ├── Chamberlain
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│ │ └── Yggdrasil
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^ ├── iRobot
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│ ├<> Nazara
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│ └── Nest
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│ ├<─ Chromecasts
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└── 10.0.3.0
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│ └<─ User devices
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├── Games
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└── 10.0.2.0 -- IoT Subnet
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├── Tachikoma
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├── Chamberlain Garage Door
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└── Tricorder
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├── iRobot Housekeeping
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└── Nest Thermostat
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```
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```
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For more details on what runs on what host, look to [AniNIX/Ubiqtorate](/AniNIX/Ubiqtorate), particularly the `playbooks/deploy.yml` file, and the network traffic captured in [AniNIX/Sharingan](https://sharingan.aninix.net/).
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For more details on what runs on what host, look to [AniNIX/Ubiqtorate](/AniNIX/Ubiqtorate), particularly the `playbooks/deploy.yml` file, and the network traffic captured in [AniNIX/Sharingan](https://sharingan.aninix.net/).
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@ -26,14 +32,12 @@ The general idea here is thus:
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* 10.0.1.0/24 is the service subnet, with NAT access from Shadowfeed creating a pseudo-secured DMZ for other AniNIX-controlled machines.
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* 10.0.1.0/24 is the service subnet, with NAT access from Shadowfeed creating a pseudo-secured DMZ for other AniNIX-controlled machines.
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* SSH and HTTPS access is then filtered through the NAT controls -- typically, traffic passes through Core to ensure the right security headers get set and only the approved applications get accessed.
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* SSH and HTTPS access is then filtered through the NAT controls -- typically, traffic passes through Core to ensure the right security headers get set and only the approved applications get accessed.
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* This also assists in letting Core's network IDS and IPS capture threat data for Sharingan.
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* This also assists in letting Core's network IDS and IPS capture threat data for Sharingan.
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* It also assists in that
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* It also assists in that we have a central location for WAF and SSL.
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* 10.0.2.0/24 is the vendor subnet -- machines here get external access but no access to any host not themselves in 10.0.0.0/8.
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* 10.0.2.0/24 is the vendor subnet -- machines here get external access but no access to any host not themselves in 10.0.0.0/8. Their DNS is also routed into
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* 10.0.3.0/24 is the user subnet -- machines here can access the external world and 10.0.1.0/24 but not 10.0.2.0/24.
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* Other 10.0.0.0/8 subnets are reserved for testing.
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Ideally, only the following external ports are open:
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Ideally, only the following external ports are open:
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* 22/tcp/ssh to Core, for read-write access
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* 22/tcp/ssh to Core, for read-write access
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* 443/tcp/https to Core, for read-only access
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* 443/tcp/https to Core, for read-only access
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* 6697/tcp/ircs to Core, for communication access
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* 6697/tcp/ircs to Core, for communication access
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* Some external NAT port for bastion access to Nazara.
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* Some external NAT port for bastion access to Nazara.
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This ideal isn't currently met, due to some application limitations, but we're working on it.
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